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4GLOBAL ECONOMIC NETWORKS AND
GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM
Francis Snyder*
1. Introduction
How are global economic networks - including transatlantic economic
networks - governed? I suggest that they are governed by the totality of
strategically determined, situationally specific, and often episodic
conjunctions of a multiplicity of sites throughout the world. These sites have
institutional, normative, and processual characteristics. The totality of these
sites represents a new global form of legal pluralism.  This paper aims to
explore and, within limits, to substantiate this claim. It invites us to think
systematically about how global economic networks are governed by global
legal pluralism.
This paper forms part of a broader research project on the governance of
globalisation. The project analyses the resolution of trade disputes between
the European Union (EU) and China.1 It focuses on a series of case studies,
                                         
* Professor of European Community Law, European University Institute, Florence: Co-
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1 For other publications from the project, see: Francis Snyder, ‘Legal Aspects of Trade
between the European Union and China: Preliminary Reflections’, in Nicholas Emiliou
and David O’Keeffe (ed), The European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT
Uruguay Round (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1996), pp 363-377; Francis Snyder,
International Trade and Customs Law of the European Union (Butterworths, London,
5one of which concerns the international trade in toys between the EU and
China. Here I draw on this case study briefly and selectively for the purpose
of my theoretical argument. Though based on a specific example, this
theoretical argument also applies to transatlantic regulatory cooper ion
between the United States and the European Union.
The paper aims to increase our understanding of how global economic
networks are governed and improve our capacity to analyse these new forms
of governance, rather than to promote law reform or advance a specific
political or institutional agenda. Consequently, its perspective is more
sociological than normative. It adopts, for the most part, the standpoint of
strategic actors. Relations among strategic actors can be envisaged as
involving different types of organisations, whether firms, states, or regional
or international organisations. Alternatively, we can see them as implicating
different structures of governance, whether market-based, polity-based, or
based on conventions in the form of international agreements. From a third
perspective, these relationships put into play global economic networks and
various sites of global legal pluralism. The paper is intended to highlight all
of these perspectives.
                                                                                                                   
1998), pp 594-600 and passim; Francis Snyder, ‘Europeanisation and Globalisation as
Friends and Rivals: European Union Law and Global Economic Networks’, ,in Francis
Snyder (ed), The Europeanisation of Law(Hart Publishing, Oxford, in press); Francis
Snyder, ‘Governing Globalisation: The European Union in the Global Legal Arena’,
(1999) 5 European Law Journal, Special Issue on ‘Globalisation and Law’, forthcoming;
Francis Snyder, ‘Legal Issues in EU-China Trade Relations’, Wuha  University Law
Review, forthcoming 1999 [in Chinese]; and Francis Snyder and Song Ying, Introduction
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6The remainder of the paper is divided into four main parts. The next part
(Part 2) discusses the meaning of globalisation. Part 3  i troduces the global
commodity chain in toys, which provides an empirical anchor for the
theoretical argument. Part 4 then summarises the basic theoretical argument
regarding global legal pluralism. Part 5 identifies some of the sites of global
legal pluralism which are the most significant for this global economic
network. On the basis of this discussion, the conclusion sets forth a series of
hypotheses for future research.
2. The meaning of globalisation
Thinking about how global economic networks are governed requires a
concept of globalisation. By globalisation, I refer to an aggregate of
multifaceted, uneven,  often contradictory economic, political, social and
cultural processes which are characteristic of our time. This paper
concentrates primarily on the economic aspects, but these need to be set
within a more general framework.
In economic terms, the most salient features of globalisation, driven by
multinational firms, are for the present purposes the development of
international production networks (IPNs), dispersion of production facilities
among different countries, the technical and functional fragmentation of
production, the fragmentation of ownership, the flexibility of the production
process, worldwide sourcing, an increase in intra-firm trade, the
interpenetration of international financial markets, the possibility of virtually
instantaneous worldwide flows of information, changes in the nature of
employment, and the emergence of new forms of work.
7Viewed from a political standpoint, globalisation has witnessed the rise of
new political actors such as multinational firms, non-governmental
organisations and social movements. It has tended to weaken, fragment, and
sometimes even restructure the state, but has not by any means destroyed or
replaced it. Globalisation has also altered r dically  the relationship to which
we have become accustomed in recent history between governance and
territory. It thus has blurred and splintered the boundaries between the
domestic and external spheres of nation-states and of regional integration
organisations; fostered the articulation of systems of multi-level governance,
interlocking politics and policy networks; and helped to render universal the
discourse of and claims for human rights. In many political and legal
settings, such as the European Union, it has raised serious questions about
the nature and appropriate form of contemporary governance.
Among the manifold social processes involved in globalisation are the
spread of certain models of production and  patterns of consumption from
specific geographic/political/national contexts to others. Contradictory
tendencies have developed towards internationalisation and localisation
within as well as among different regions and countries. We have also
witnessed the uneven development of new social movements based on
different, if not alternative, forms of community.
Seen as a cultural phenomenon, globalisation has implied the emergence of a
new global culture, which is shared to some extent by virtually all elite
groups. This has enhanced the  globalisation of the imagination and of the
8imaginable.2 At the same time it has contributed to the marginalisation of
many local cultures. Consequently, it has sometimes increased the range and
depth of international and infranational cultural conflicts, as well as
resistance to new forms of cultural imperialism.
3. A global economic network: the global commodity chain
in toys
Global economic networks take various forms. I focus here on the
international toy industry. The Barbie doll illustrates the toy industry’s
domestic impact and global reach. In European countries, imports of toys
from Asia have sometimes provoked reactions bordering on xenophobia. In
the United States they have triggered outrage against cheap Chinese labour
and trade deficits with China, which in the case of the toy trade between
China and the USA was claimed by the US to amount to US $5.4 billion.3
This has not, however, been true by and large of the Barbie doll, which is
usually viewed instead as a United States or even global product.
The Barbie doll’s label says 'made in China'. This suggests, correctly, that, in
the production of Barbie,  China provides the factory space, labour, and
electricity, as well as cotton cloth for the dress. It conceals, however, the
facts that Japan supplies the nylon hair, Saudia Arabia provides oil, Taiwan
refines oil into ethylene for plastic pellets for the body, Japan, the US, and
Europe supply almost all the machinery and tools, most of the molds (the
                                         
2 For this expression, I am indebted to Prof. Pietro Barcellona, oral intervention at the
Conference on ‘Quelle culture pour l’Euope? Ordres juridiques et cult res dans le
processus de globalisation’, Réseau Européen de Droit et Société (REDS) and Istituto di
Ricerca sui Problemi dello Stato e delle Istitutionzi (IRSI), Rome, 2-3 November 1998.
3 Rone  Tempest, 'Barbie and the World Economy', L s Angeles Times World Report [A
Special Section Produced in Cooperation with The Korea Times], Sunday, October 13,
9most expensive item), come from the US, Japan, or Hong Kong, the United
States supplies cardboard packaging and paint pigments, and Hong Kong
provides supplies the banking and insurance and carries out the delivery of
the raw materials to factories in south China together with the collection of
the finished products and shipping. Two Barbie dolls are marketed every
second in 140 countries around the world by Mattel Inc. of El Segundo,
Callifornia. In Palo Alto, California there is a Barbie doll museum. Barbie
celebrated her 40th birthday on March 9, 1999, and the US Post Office
released a commemorative U.S. postage stamp in June in her honour.4 T
Barbie doll is quintessentially American in origin, style and culture, and of
course is the result of a global commodity chain powered by a US buyer. But
Barbie is a global product, if by ‘global’ we refer to the fragmentation of the
production process, the dispersion of production facilities among different
countries, and the organisation of production within international production
networks.
We can understand this industry most easily by conceiving of it as a global
commodity chain. By ‘commodity chain’, I mean ‘a network of labor and
production processes whose end result is a finished commodity’.5 Global
commodity chains tend to be strongly connected to specific systems of
production and to involve particular patterns of coordinated trade.6
                                                                                                                   
1996, p 3.
4 Elizabeth Rapoport, ‘Barbie at 40’, Sky (Delta Air Lines), March 1999, 54-57.
5 Terence K Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Commodity Chains in the World-
Economy Prior to 1800’, Review, 10, 1986, 157-170 at  159.
6 Gary Gereffi, ‘The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S.
Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks’, in Gary Gereffi and Miguel
Korzeniewicz (ed), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Greenwood Press,
10
Each global commodity chain, if we follow Gereffi’s widely accepted
schema, has three main dimensions. The first refers to the structure of inputs
and outputs: products and services are linked together in a sequence in
which each activity adds value to its predecessor. The second concerns
territoriality; networks of enterprises may be spatially dispersed or
concentrated. The third dimension is the structure of governance:
relationships of power and authority determine the flow and allocation of
resources (financial, material, human) within the chain.7
Here we are interested especially in the third dimension, the structure of
governance. Gereffi distinguishes two distinct types of governance structures
in global commodity chains. On the one hand are producer-driven
commodity chains, in which the system of production is controlled by large
integrated industrial enterprises. On the other hand are buyer-driven
commodity chains, in which production networks are typically decentralised
and power rests with large retailers, brand-name merchandisers and trading
companies.8 This distinction provides a useful point of departure for
analysing the global commodity chain in the EU-China toy trade.
The international toy industry is a prime example of an international
commodity chain dominated by the buyers. It is hierarchically organised. At
the top of the hierarchy are large buyers as well as large retailers. The buyers
include several US manufacturers, two Japanese manufacturers, and one
European company. The most important buyers are two American
                                                                                                                   
Westport, CN, 1994) 95-122 at 96.
7 Gereffi, ‘The Organization…’, at 96-97.
8 Gereffi, ‘The Organization…’, at 97.
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companies, Mattel and Hasbro. The key elements in the power of buyers are
designs and brands. The large buyers are the nod in various networks of
inventors and creators of toys. Through contract, they control the access of
inventors, intermediaries, and factories to the market.The most important
retailers include large specialist stores such as Toys “R” Us, discount houses
such as Wal-Mart in the US, and hypermarkets or catalogue stores in the EU.
Taking buyers and retailers together, the power of this group lies in its
control of design, brands, and marketing.
Buyers and retailers compete, however, with regard to access to retail
markets. The powerful buyers are dependent to some degree on large
retailers, such as Toys “R” Us. With regard to the retail market, as economic
downturns reveal, the two groups have conflicting interests. To maintain
market share, and to enhance their dominant position in the global
commodity chain, buyers have tried recently to lessen their dependence on
retailers. Their strategies for doing so include increased direct-to-consumer
sales, such as catalogs and Internet sales, either from their own website or
from online retailers.9
The US firms have regional headquarters and a significant share of the toy
market in Europe. The European Union toy market is supplied mainly
through importer-wholesalers. As of 1995, the EU toy industry comprised
about 2600 firms, producing a great variety of toys, and employing just
under 100,000 workers, with only 15 firms having more than 500
                                         
9 See George Anders and Lisa Bannon, ‘Etoys to join web-retailer parade with IPO’, The
Wall Street Journal. Tuesday, April 6, 1999, p B1.
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employees.10 Each country has its own distinctive retail sector, varying from
catalogue stores through hypermarkets to independent retailers.11 Except for
Lego, established in Denmark in 1932 and now one of the world’s ten
largest toy manufacturers, there are no large manufacturers or specialist
retailers based in Europe similar to those based in the USA. Together with
LEGO and the Japanese firm Bandai, the US firms dominated the first main
peak trade association, Toy Manufacturers of Europe, formed in the early
1990s, and are now the principal players in the current EU peak association,
Toy Industries of Europe (TIE).
Further down the hierarchy come the Hong Kong companies which act as
intermediaries between these multinationals and the toy factories. In East
Asia, Hong Kong has been of signal importance in the development of the
toy industry. Its role first started in the 1940s as an export platform, then
developed in the 1980s as original equipment manufacturers (OEM) for
overseas importers or as intermediaries between local manufacturers and
overseas buyers until, starting in the 1990s, Hong Kong became a re-
exporter of toys made in China. In 1998, licensing and contract
manufacturing for overseas manufacturers, usually to production
specifications and product designs provided by the buyers, accounted for an
estimated 70% of total domestic toy exports.12 US buyers accounted for 51%
                                         
10 Commission of the European Communities, 'Report from the Commission to the
Council on the surveillance measures and quantitative quotas applicable to certain non-
textile products originating in the People's Republic of China', COM(95)614 final,
Brussels, 6.12.95,p 41.
11 See Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Practical Guide to Exporting Toys for
Hong Kong Traders (Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Research Department,
March 1999), pp 34-58.
12 'Hong Kong's Toy Industry', Hong Kong & China Economics, on the internet homepage
of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council at
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of Hong Kong’s toy exports in the first ten months of 1995.13 Today Hong
Kong is the location of management, design, R&D, marketing, quality
control, finance and usually shipping.14
At the bottom of the hierarchy are the factories, most of which are located in
China. By 1995 toy production in China involved about 3,000 factories
employing more than 1.3 million people.15 Such factories usually occupy the
structural position of original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing to
other companies’ specifications with machinery provided by the buyer.
However, some now operate on the basis of original design manufacturer
(ODM), producing to provided designs but sharing the cost of machinery
and investment as well as sharing markets according to an agreement with
the buyer.16 These contracts are often arranged and managed by Hong Kong-
based entrepreneurs, who in addition to their role as intermediaries
sometimes run their own toy manufacturing company in China and are also
prominent in the main Hong Kong sectoral trade association, Hong Kong
Toys Council. More than half of China's toy production is re-exported
through Hong Kong.17 For this reason, as well as to preserve maximum
                                                                                                                   
<http://www.tdc.org.hk/main/industries/t2_2_39.htm>, last updated 2 July 1998.
13 Journal of Commerce, Friday, January 13, 1995, no page reference.
14 See the statement by Dennis Ting, who as of January 1995 was chairman of  Kader
Industrial Co. Ltd., a leading Hong Kong toy firm, as well as of the Hong Kong trading
agency’s toy advisory committee and of the Hong Kong Toy Council: Journal of
Commerce, Friday, January 13, 1995, no page reference.
15 Jim Newton and Lai-hing Tse, ' 'Kids' Stuff: The Organisation and Politics of the
China-EU Trade in Toys', in Roger Strange, Jim Slater, and Liming Wang (eds), Trade
and Investment in China: The European Experience (Routledge, London and New York,
1998), pp at 147-165 at 154.
16 Interviews in Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone,
China.
17 BBC Monitoring Service: Asia Pacific, 14 June 1995, cited in Newton and Tse, ' 'Kids'
Stuff…’ at 154.
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flexibility in a highly innovative and rapidly changing market, the
production of toys for the export market usually takes place in wholly owned
subsidiaries rather than joint ventures.18  Today China and Hong Kong
account for nearly 60% of world's toy trade.19
4. The shape of global legal pluralism
We usually view the legal arrangements which are relevant to such global
economic networks in one of two ways. Often we see them essentially in
terms of contracts between nominally equal parties, such as individuals,
companies, or states, whose agreement is consecrated either in bilateral or
multilateral form. Alternatively, we conceive of them in hierarchical terms,
for example as constituting various regional or international forms of multi-
level governance. I wish to suggest, however, that both of these conceptions,
regardless of their force in normative terms, are descriptively inaccurate and
analytically incomplete. There is a fundamental and growing disjunction
between our traditional normative conceptions of the law governing
international trade and the shape of the economic networks which are an
integral part of economic globalisation. Global economic networks are the
product of and a form of strategic behaviour, even though such networks
usually have a particular locus of power and a specific hierarchy. In order to
understand how they are governed in practice, we need to revise our basic
ideas about the shape of the global legal order, without necessarily expecting
economic relations and the law to be isomorphic.
                                         
18 See Newton and Tse, ' 'Kids' Stuff…’ at 153.
19 'Chinese Toy Making: Where the Furbies come from', The Economist, December 19,
1998, p. 95-99 at 95.
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I suggest that the most adequate concept for understanding the global legal
order is global legal pluralism. Global legal pluralism, as I use the term, 20
comprises two different aspects. The first is structural, the second relational.
First, global legal pluralism involves a variety of institutions, norms, and
dispute resolution processes located, and produced, at different structured
sites around the world. Legal scholarship has traditionally paid most
attention to understanding state, regional, and international (trade) legal
institutions, legally binding norms, and dispute resolution processes
involving law. The main exceptions in the legal world are international
lawyers, who have also devoted much energy to the study of international
negotiations and to norms that at least in principle are not legally binding.
The analysis of international regimes, multi-level governance, and other
types of institutional arrangements has largely been the province of political
scientists and specialists in international relations. Examples in the field of
EU legal scholarship include the work on multi-level governance,
committees, and more generally on different types of settings, whether
highly institutionalised with specified norms, rules and procedures or non-
hierarchical and decentralised. While it is possible to generalise to some
extent from this previous work, no one has tried to unite these different
elements.  Some basic questions remain therefore to be answered. What is a
site? States and regional and international organisations are included, but so
are a diversity of other institutional, normative, and processual sites, such as
commercial arbitration, trade associations, and so on. How are sites created,
                                         
20 My use of the term is broader than that of Gunther Teubner, ‘”Global Bukowina”:
Legal Pluralism in World Society’, in Gunther Teubner (ed), Global Law Without a State
(Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997. For further discussion of Teubner’s stimulating ideas, see
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and how do they grow, survive or die? How are they structured? What does
it mean to say that different structured sites are the anchors of contemporary
legal pluralism?
Second, the relations among these sites are of many different types, in terms
of both structure and process. For example, in terms of structural
relationships, sites may be autonomous and even independent, part of the
same or different regimes, part of a single system of multi-level governance,
or otherwise interconnected. In terms of process, they may be distinct and
discrete, competing, overlapping, or feed into each other, for example in the
sense of comprising a ‘structural set’, ‘formed through the mutual
convertibility of rules and resources in one domain of action into those
pertaining to another’.21 These relations of structure and process constitute
the global legal playing field. They determine the basic characteristics of
global legal pluralism, such as equality or hierarchy, dominance or
submission, creativity or imitation, convergence or divergence, and so on.
They influence profoundly the growth, development, and survival of the
different sites.
Global legal pluralism is not merely an important part of the context in
which global economic networks are constructed, in the sense that it is a
factor to be taken into account by strategic actors. It is integral to these
global economic networks themselves. In other words, global economic
networks are constructed on a global playing field, which is organised or
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21 Anthony Giddens, ‘A Reply to My Critics’, in David Held and John B. Thompson,
Social Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and His Critics (Camb dge
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structured partly by global legal pluralism. Global legal pluralism does
more, however, than simply provide the rules of the game. It also constitutes
the game itself, including the players.
5. Global legal pluralism and the global commodity chain in
toys
5.1 The theory of commodity chains
We are now in a position to consider in more detail the interconnection
between global legal pluralism and the global commodity chain in toys. Let
us, following Hopkins and Wallerstein,  use the term ‘boxes’ to refer to the
separable processes involved in the international toy industry.22 The
boundaries of each box are socially defined, and so may be redefined.23
Technological and social organisational cha ges  play a role in these
processes. So too, does law. Conceived broadly to encompass the sites of
global legal pluralism, with each site comprising its specific institutions,
norms and processes. Law helps to construct and to define the box s which
make up the global commodity chain in toys.
Hopkins and Wallerstein24 propose  a series of questions concerning the
social organisation of the constituent units of any single box in the chain.
1.  Number of components units in each box
2.  Geographic concentration or dispersal
                                                                                                                   
University Press, 1989), pp 253-259 at 299.
22 Terence K Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Commodity Chains: Construct and
Research’, in Commodity Chains in the Capitalist World-Economy Prior to 1800’, in
Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism
(Greenwood Process, Westport, CN, 1994), 17-20 at 18.
23 Hopkins and Wallerstein, ‘Commodity Chains…’,at 18.
24 Hopkins and Wallerstein, ‘Commodity Chains…’, at 18-19.
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3.  Membership in one or more chains
4.  Property arrangements
5.  Modes of labour control
6. Links between different chains
I add two further issues:
7.  Connection between economic relations and specific sites
8.  Relations between sites and the chain as a whole
Thus here I rephrase, elaborate, ndadd to Hopkins’ and Wallerstein’s
questions, giving special emphasis to the institutional, normative, and
processual components of the sites of global egal pluralism. I offer selected
examples of the interconnections between these sites and the international
commodity chain. The discussion ismeant to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
5.2 Number of component units
First, the number of component units in the box. To what degree is a box
monopolised by a small number of production units? What are the main
factors determining this structure? What incentives for a particular structure
are provided by legal and other institutions, norms, and processes? Do
different sites of global legal pluralism provide conflicting incentives, and if
so, how are these conflicts managed, if not neutralised? If demonopolisation
of any highly profitable box is an important process in the contemporary
world economy, as Hopkins and W llerstein suggest,25 what role do the sites
of global legal pluralism play with regard to this process, for example by
encouraging it, by countering it by redefining the boundaries of the box or
                                         
25 Hopkins and Wallerstein, ‘Commodity Chains…’, at 18.
19
by other means, or by creating incentives for shifting capital investment to
other boxes, or even other chains?
Several sites of global legal pluralism play a role in shaping or determining
the number of component units in any given box in the international
commodity chain in toys. Consider three examples. First, United States
intellectual property law is of crucial significance in determining the number
of buyers and maintaining their market power. Second, antitrust law is
crucial in defining the number of key buyers or manufacturers in the
international toy industry. American competition law affects the possibility
of mergers among buyers. When market leader Mattel Inc acquired the third
largest toy manufacturer, Tyco Toys Inc., in 1996, Mattel was quoted in the
American media as expressing confidence that th deal would not be
blocked by US antitrust law, even though the companies’ combined sales
represented 19% of the US toy market.26 Third, the lack of binding legal
regulation of Internet retailing lowers barriers to entry into the retail market
in toys. Consequently, when buyers are squeezed by traditional retailers,
they turn without great difficulty to the Internet in order to enter the retail
sector themselves, either through specialist Internet retailers or by means of
the buyers’ own ebsites.
5.3 Geographic concentration or dispersal
Second, geographic concentration or dispersal. What is the degree of
geographic spread of the units in a specific box? In other words, are the units
in a specific box geographically concentrated, or are they dispersed? For
                                         
26 James Madore, ‘Mattel confident Tyco deal will pass antitrust scrutiny’, The Buffalo
News, Tuesday, November 19, 1996, no page reference.
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example, are the provision of finance, marketing, and retailing
geographically concentrated, while production is dispersed? Is the prevailing
geographic pattern influenced by the sites of global legal pluralism, and if
so, how? For example, what incentives do different institutions, norms, and
processes provide for either concentration or dispersal of the different sites?
Do these institutions, norms, and processes play a role in the extent to which
boxes shift from the core to the periphery of the world economy, assuming
that, as Hopkins and Wallerstein argue, a box is likely to be relatively
geographically concentrated in the core but dispersed on the periphery?
We have already seen that invention, finance, marketing, and retailing in the
international toy industry are concentrated, the first in the USA, the second
and third in the USA and Hong Kong, and the last, so far as control is
concerned, in the USA and to a much lesser extent Europe and Japan.
Production, however, is potentially much more dispersed, even though until
recently it has tended to be concentrated in Asia. The geographical
separation of production from finance, marketing, and retailing is
encouraged by international norms concerning the customs operations
known in the EU as inward processing and outward processing.27 It is no
exaggeration to describe the existence and increased use of these customs
rules as the legal basis for what has been called ‘the new international
division of labour’.28  The overarching international legal framework is
                                         
27 On EU law, see Francis Snyder, Int national Trade and Customs Law of the European
Union (Butterworths, London, 1998), 83-103.
28 For case studies from an economic standpoint, see Folker Froebel, Juergen Heinrichs,
and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labour: Structural Unemployment in
Industrialised Countries and Industrialisation in Developing Countries  (trans. Pete
Burgress) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Editions de la Maison des Sciences
de l’Homme, Paris, 1980.
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provided by the International Convention on the Simplification and
Harmonization of Customs Procedures, which was signed at Kyoto on 18
May 1973 and entered in force on 25 September 1974.29 The CCC now has
about ninety members, including the US, the EC and its Member States,
Hong Kong, and China. Not all of these, however, are party to all the
relevant annexes, such as Annex E.6 concerning temporary admission for
inward processing, Annex E.8 concerning temporary exportation for
outward processing, and Annex F.1 concerning free zones.These annexes
contain the basic substantive rules, which are not legally binding but may
take effect as standards, recommended practices, or notes.
China has ratified the Convention but has not accepted any of these three
annexes. Since the early 1980s, however, Chinese legislation, both central
and local, on Special Economic Zones has had a direct influence on the
concentration of production facilities in the international toy trade. Most toy
factories are located in the Shenzhen SEZ. Shenzhen rules on foreign direct
investment (FDI) provide for Chinese-foreign joint ventures, Chinese-
foreign contractual joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned enterprises,
international leasing, compensation trade, and processing and assembling
with materials and parts from foreign suppliers.30 Rec ntly, however, the
fact that labour costs in Shenzehn are higher than in the rest of Guandong
Province, due partly to law, has encouraged toy companies to establish
outside the SEZ, though still in Gua dong.
                                         
29 OJ EC 1975 L100/2; Cmnd 5938.
30 For an introduction, see the Shenzhen SEZ Internet homepage at < http://china-
window.com/Shenzhen-w/shenzhen.html.>
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5.4 Membership in one or more chains
Third, membership of one or more chains. Is a box located in more than one
commodity chain? If so, how many? Do specific sites, including institutions,
norms, and processes, create a structure of incentives so that a particular box
tends to be inserted in more than one commodity chain, nor not?  To what
extent, and how, is this insertion of a particular box in different commodity
chains accomplished partly by the law? What role do law and other types of
norms play in the management of relations between the different commodity
chains in which a particular box is located?
5.5 Property arrangements
Fourth, property arrangements. What property-like arrangements (such as
use, ownership, management, control) are associated with the units of a
specific box? Which sites of global legal pluralism are the most relevant to
these arrangements? Which specific institutions, norms, and processes are
determinative with regard to the arrangements in a particular site? Why? If
different property-like arrangements prevail among the various units in a
box, what institutions, norms, and processes encourage or tolerate diversity?
How is such diversity managed?
5.6 Modes of labour control
Fifth, modes of labour control. What modes of labour control are found in
each box? Which sites of global legal pluralism are most relevant, and why?
Which specific institutions, norms, and processes are significant, and why?
To what extent are different modes of labour control encouraged or
faciliated by legal or other institutions, norms, and processes? Are there
conflicts among different sites with regard to modes of labour control? If so,
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how are these conflicts resolved in institutional, normative, and processual
terms?
The labour law of nation-states is not the only  r levant law, or in the case of
China even the most important. Far more significant are the codes of
conduct elaborated under the aegis of multinational companies and sector-
specific trade associations. They reflect the organisation of power in the
global toy commodity chain in two respects. First, the dominant buyers,
whose power rests on their control of brands and marketing, are able in
effect to determine the content of industry-wide codes of conduct and
impose them on their suppliers. Codes of conduct thus are analogous to
standard-form contracts laid down by the leading firms in a particular
market.31 Second, precisely because the dominant buyers are few in number,
they are unusually susceptible to political pressure. Non-governmental
organisations, such as the Toy Coalition, have successfully put pressure on
the small number of powerful American buyers, and the national and
international trade associations they control, to elaborate codes of conduct
with regard to their mainly Asian workforce.
5.7 Links between different chains
Sixth, links between different commodity chains. How are the boxes within a
particular commodity chain linked to each other? Which specific
institutions, norms, and processes create, sustain, or transform these links?
What role do different sites of global legal pluralism play in linking different
boxes? Is there any overall coordination of these links? How is the
                                         
31 Peter T Muchlinski, ‘”Global Bukowina” Examined: Viewing the Multinational
Enterprise as a Transnational Law-making Community’, in G ther Teubner (ed), Global
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discreteness of a particular commodity chain maintained, and what role does
global legal pluralism play in this respect?
5.8 Connections between economic relations and specific sites
A seventh set of questions concerns specifically the connections between
particular sets of economic relations (boxes) and specific sites of global
legal pluralism. Do specific sites concern particular aspects of specific
boxes? For example, do certain sites deal with labour control, others with
financial arrangements, others with marketing, others with dispute
resolution, and so on? How, and why? To what extent are particular sites
important in governing the social organisation of the constituent units of a
box even when the sites are not geographically proximate to the box, in
other words when governance, economic processes, and territory are not
congruent?
Four examples illustrate the relationship between the marketing of toys and
the EU as a legal site. First, quotas were applied to imports into the EU of
toys from China until 1998, provoking a series of cases before the European
Court of Justice.32 Second, the EC 'toys directive'33 provides that all toys
sold in the EU must meet essential safety requirements and bear a 'CE' mark
indicating conformity. It conditions Chinese production of toys for export to
Europe and the conduct of inspections in Hong Kong.34 Third, with regard to
EC environmental legislation, though no EU legislation has been yet been
                                                                                                                   
Law Without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997) 79-108 at 86.
32  For a detailed analysis, see Francis Snyder, ‘Governing l balisation…’.
33 Council Directive 88/378/EEC, as amended.
34 See 'Hong Kong's Toy Industry', Hong Kong & China Economics, on the internet
homepage of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council at
<http://www.tdc.org.hk/main/industries/t2_2_39.htm>, last updated 2 July 1998.
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enacted in response to pressure from Greenpeace to ban all soft PVC toys for
children in the EU, the risk that it might be has already changed the practices
of some toy factories in China which export to the EU.35 Fourth, general EC
trade legislation affects Chinese toy exports. As from January 1998,
preferences for certain Chinese goods were removed under the EC's
Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), leading to an increase in the
tariff rate for toys to levels varying between 3.4% and 6.3%.36
5.9 Relations between sites and the chain as a whole
Eighth, relations between sites and the chain as a whole. What types of
relationships, for example horizontal or vertical, competitive or cooperative,
marked-based or state-based or convention-based, exist between the
different sites that are relevant to a specific global commodity chain? Does
any specific site concern the global commodity chain as a whole? To what
extent does the plurality of sites provide an effective way of managing the
chain as a whole? Would a single site or a small number of sites be more
effective? What does ‘effective’ mean in this context? In other words, what
are our criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of specific sites, and of the
totality of sites which we call global legal pluralism, in the organisation and
management of the chain as a whole?
Certain sites concern several parts of the chain or the chain as a whole. The
most well-known example is the Uruguay Round agreements associated with
the World Trade Organization (WTO). This includes the General Agreement
                                         
35 Interviews in Guangzhou and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, China.
36 'Hong Kong's Toy Industry', Hong Kong & China Economics, on the internet homepage
of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council at
<http://www.tdc.org.hk/main/industries/t2_2_39.htm>, last updated 2 July 1998.
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS).
The GATT/WTO was a crucial conditioning element in the negotiation of
the EU quota on toys from China in 1993-94 and the related litigation
between 1994-1998.37 It also cast a long shadow with regard to future
disputes, notably by holding out, to China and multinational companies
‘located’ there, the promise of new institutions, norms, and processes which
would be available on eventual Chinese accession. When China joins the
GATT, the firms located there will benefit from Article XI GATT
concerning the general elimination of quantitative restrictions. The provision
of services and the protection of intellectual property in brand names are
likely to be affected by the eventual application of GATS and TRIPS. It may
also be argued that the impact of the GATT on China is already real, even if
China has not yet acceded to the WTO.  Companies are already positioning
themselves in anticipating of further opening up of China's domestic market
to imported toys and foreign toy retailers. One has only to note that in 1997,
the same year it purchased a major competitor Tyco, Mattel launched Barbie
in China.38
6. Conclusion
I have argued here that global economic networks are governed by the
totality of strategically determined, situationally specific, and often episodic
conjunctions of a multiplicity of institutional, normative, and processual
                                         
37 For detailed analysis, see Francis Snyder, ‘Governing lobalisation…’ .
38 See the history of Mattel on the company internet homepage at
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sites throughout the world. The totality of such sites represents a new global
form of legal pluralism.
The development of the global economic relations involved in the
international toy industry owes much to corporate strategies. But these
strategies themselves have been pursued taking account of the framework of
the law and have been elaborated by using the law. They take place, are
conditioned by, and have contributed to the development of global legal
pluralism. To put it more accurately, the development of global networks in
the toy industry has occurred in conjunction with the development of a
variety of structural sites throughout the world, each of which comprises
institutions, norms, and dispute resolution processes.
Taken together, these different but interwoven sets of norms, whether legally
binding in formal terms or soft law, amount to a distinct regime for
governing global economic networks. They are, however, less a structure of
multi-level governance than a conjunction of distinctive institutional and
normative sites for the production, implementation and sanctioning of rules.
In the specific case of the toy industry, they testify, in part, to the structure
of authority and power within these inter-firm and intra-firm networks,
which are characterised by a buyer-driven, rather than a producer-driven,
governance structure. These new normative forms for governing global
economic networks are among the reasons why the American, EU, and
Chinese firms and economies are so intimately linked in the
internationalised production and distribution relations which are
characteristic of globalisation.
                                                                                                                   
<http://www.snc.edu/baad/ba485/spr1998/group8/history.htm>.
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Several more specific hypotheses can be derived from this discussion. First,
global egal pluralism is a way of describing the structure of the sites taken
as a whole. Seen from the perspective on a specific global commodity chain,
global egal pluralism may be described as a network, even if some segments
of the network may be occuped alternatively by two or more possible sites.
Second, the sites of global legal plur ism  may be classified provisionally
into three rough categories. Some sites are market-based, being generated by
economic actors as part of economic processes. Some are polity-based, in
that they form a part of established political structures. Others are
convention-based, deriving from agreements between governments. This
classification scheme distinguishes between different types of sites
according to their mode of creation.
Third, the various sites differ in decision-making structure, that is, in their
institutions, norms and processes. These factors affect the outcomes of the
various sites, including the different ways in which they allocate risk. At the
same time, however, it is important not to overlook the extent to which sites
are interrelated, for example in relation to institutional arrangements such as
jurisdiction, copying or borrowing of norms, and the interconnection of their
dispute-resolution processes.
Fourth, the sites are not all equally vulnerable to economic pressures. It is
going too far to say that the network of global legal pluralism which is put
into play by the economic processes of any specific global commodity chain
reflects the structure of authority and power in the global commodity chain
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in question. Some types of institutions, some types of processes, and some
types of norms are more permeable to economic processes than others.
Fifth, the economic organisations occupying the same box in a global
commodity chain are sometimes if not often in conflict. These conflicts
involve and have important implications for sites. For example, conflicts
over markets may pit foreign producers, exporters and importers, on one
hand, against domestic producers, on the other hand. Conflicts over markets
also occur between companies occupying similar positions in the chain The
occupants of each of these segments try to enlist the norms, institutions and
processes of the various sites of global legal pluralism to improve their
position, not only vis-à-vis their direct competitors but also in relation to the
occupants of other segments of the global commodity chain.
Sixth, taken as a whole, the various sites are not necessarily hierarchically
ordered in relation to each other. Instead, they demonstrate many other types
of interrelationships, both symmetrical and asymmetrical, as is the case with
many aspects of transatlantic regulatory cooperation between the EU and the
USA. In other words, they do not make up a legal system , even viewed in a
more general perspective. This contrasts strongly with the usual lawyer’s
view of the multi-level governance of international economic relations. On
such a view, in so far as they involve EU and US firms and governments,
they are governed by a hierachically ordered combination of EU, US, and
WTO law. Or if they involve EU firms, they are governed mainly by a
hierarchically ordered combination of WTO law, EU law and the law of the
EU Member States. That is   normative perspective. It is different from the
more sociological perspective that I have tried to develop here.
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Seventh, these sites are not always, or even usually, alternatives in dispute
resolution, as might be expected if one presumes that the norms governing
global economic networks are ordered in a hierarchical arrangement.
Instead, each site deals with, governs, or seeks to govern a discrete part of
the global commodity chain. Once a chain is established, its activities are
governed by a given set of rules, emanating from a variety of linked sites,
except to the extent that private international law and normal conflicts of law
rules allow firms a choice of governing legislation or a choice of dispute
resolution.
Numerous questions remain to be addressed by future research. For
example, how are sites created? How are they constituted, developed, and
legitimated as sites?  Do sites have a specific geographical location, and if
so, why? What decision processes are involved? Do they vary in their
resemblance to state law (insertion in a hierarchy, reliance on case law,
binding decisions, use of precedent, etc.), and why?  To what extent do the
norms of a particular site combine hard law and soft law? To what extent are
sites interconnected, and how are they connected? What determines the
modes and organisation of dispute resolution? The answers to these
questions will help us to understand further how global economic networks
are governed.
